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Abstract
 Radio Frequency Identification  (RFID) technologies lay in the very heart of In-
ternet of Things (IoT), in which every physical objects are tagged and identified in 
an internet-like structure. High performance and privacy-preserving interrogations 
of individual tags, generally called private tag authentication, is crucial for effective 
monitoring and management ofa large number of objects with RFID tags. An RFID 
system consists of RF readers and RF tags. RF tags are attached to objects, and 
used as a unique identifier of the objects. RFID technologies enable a number of 
business and personal applications, and smooth the way for physical transactions in 
the real world, such as supply chain management, ransportation payment, animal 
identification, warehouse operations, and more. Though bringing great productivity 
gains, RFID systems may cause new security and privacy threats to individuals or or-
ganizations, which have become a major obstacle for their wide adaptions. Therefore, 
it is important to address the security and privacy issues in RFID systems. 
  In this dissertation, we investigate two important security andprivacy issues for 
large-scale RFID systems. 
First, we discuss the private tag authentication problems. In a singulation pro-
cess, an RF reader first sends a query and energizes an RF tag, and then the tag 
replies its ID or data to the reader. As the tag's ID itself is sensitive information, 
the reply from tags must be protected against various threats, such as eavesdropping 
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and compromise attacks, where tags are physically tampered and the keys associated 
 with compromised tags are disclosed to adversaries. Fast and secure object identi-
fication, generally called private tag authentication, is critical to efficiently monitor 
and manage a large number of objects with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technologies. In a singulation process, an RF reader queries an RF tag, and then the 
tag replies its ID or data to the reader. Since the tags ID itself is private information, 
the reply must be protected against various threats, such as eavesdropping and com-
promised attacks, where tags are physically tampered and the keys associated with 
compromised tags are disclosed to adversaries. Hence a large amount of efforts have 
been made to protect ags replies with low-cost operations, e.g., the XOR operation 
and 16-bit pseudo random functions (PRFs). In the primitive solution, a tag sends 
a hashed ID, instead of its real ID, to a reader, and then, the reader searches the 
corresponding entry in the back-end server. While this approach defends tags replies 
against various attacks, the authentication speed is of 0(N), where N is the number 
of tags in the system. Hence, such a straightforward approach is not practical for 
large-scale RFID systems. In order to efficiently and securely read tags content, pri-
vate authentication protocols with structured key management have been proposed. 
In these schemes, each tag has its unique key and a set of groups keys. Groups keys 
are shared by several tags and used to confine the search space of a unique key. With 
efficient data structures, the tag authentication completes within 0(log k N). How-
ever, private authentication protocols with structured key management u fortunately 
reduce the degree of privacy, should some tags in the system be compromised. This 
is because group keys are shared by several tags, and physical tampering of some 
tags makes the other tags less anonymous. How to remedy this issue is equivalent
iii
 to reducing the probability that two tags share  common group keys (hence after we 
refer to it as the correlation probability). The introduction ofrandom walking over a 
data structure, e.g., randomized tree-walking and randomized skip-lists, ignificantly 
reduces the correlation probability. Nevertheless, two tags are still correlated should 
they have same groups keys at all the levels of in a balanced tree or skip lists. In 
our study, we design aprivate tag authentication protocol, namely Randomized Skip 
Graphs-Based Authentication (RSGA), in which unique and group keys are main-
tained with a skip graph. The RSGA achieves lower correlation probability than the 
existing scheme while maintaining the same authentication speed as the tree struc-
ture. 
  Second, we discuss the fast and secure grouping problems. In the large-scale 
RFID systems, categorization a d grouping of individual items with RF tags are 
critical for efficient object monitoring and management. For example, when tags 
belonging to the same group share a common group ID, the reader can transmit he 
same data simultaneously to the group ID, and it is possible to save considerably the 
communication verhead as compared with the conventional unicast transmission. To
this end, Liu et al. recently propose aset of tag grouping protocols, which enables 
multicast-like communications forsimultaneous data access and distribution to the 
tags in the same group. In the reality, not only the performance issue, but also security 
and privacy-preserving mechanisms in RFID protocols are important for protecting 
the assets of individuals and organizations. Although a number of works have been 
done for protecting tag's privacy, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of private 
tag grouping is yet to be addressed.
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  To address the problem of private tag grouping in a large-scale RFID system, we 
first formulate the problem of private tag grouping and define the privacy model based 
on the random oracle model. As a baseline protocol, we design a private traditional 
polling rouping (PrivTPG) protocol based on traditional tag polling protocol. Since 
 PrivTPG is a straightforward approach, it can take a long time. Hence, based on 
the idea of broadcasting group IDs, we propose a private nhanced polling grouping 
(PrivEPG) protocol. To further improve the efficiency oftag grouping, we propose a
private Bloom filter-based grouping (PrivBFG) protocol. These protocols broadcast 
unencrypted group IDs. Therefore, we propose aprivate Cuckoo filter-based polling 
grouping (PrivCFG) protocol, which is a more secure protocol using a data structure 
called a cuckoo filter.Then, the protocol-level tag's privacy of the proposed PrivTPG, 
PrivEPG, PrivBFG, and PrivCFG is proven by random oracles. In addition, com-
puter simulations are conducted to evaluate the efficiency ofthe proposed protocols 
with different configurations.
v
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background 
 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies lay in the very heart of Inter-
net of Things (IoT), in which every physical objects are tagged and identified in an 
internet-like structure. An RFID system consists of RF readers and RF tags. An RF 
tag is attached to an object and used as the unique identifier of the object. RFID sys-
tems smooth the way of various physical transactions (ex. distribution management, 
supermarket, public transport, etc...) in the real world. 
1.1.1 RFID Technologies 
  The RFID system consists of an RF tag, an RF reader, and a back-end server. 
Communications between RF reader and backend server uses encryption method as 
used for the existing Internet, so we will not discuss it in this paper. RF tags are 
classified either active or passiv. Active tags have a transmission module and a 
battery for data transmissions. On the other hand, passive tags do not have a power 
source, and have very weak calculation power. However, since passive tags are very 
inexpensive, mass production is possible. Hence, most RFID applications employ 
passive tags, in this dissertation, we consider RFID systems with passive tags. 
I
 1.2 Contributionof This Dissertation 
In this dissertation, we propose solutions to private tag authentication a d dgroup-
ing problems. The contributions of each chapter in this dissertation are as follows: 
  • Contributions ofChapter 2 
      1. We design anew encryption-based private authentication protocol based on 
        skip graph. Unlike the existing solutions, the proposed protocol provides
        strong privacy protection i  keeping with high performance. 
2. We quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the new authentication proto-
        col based on skip graph. 
  • Contributions ofChapter 3 
      1. We introduce the grouping problem and fast grouping protocols. 
      2. We address the private tag grouping at the protocol-level, where for a given 
        tag an adversary cannot identify the tags group. 
      3. We design four private grouping protocols.
1.3 OrganizationofThisDissertation 
  Therest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we propose a
new encryption-based private authentication, called Randomized Skip Graph-Based 
Authentication (RSGA). In Chapter 3, we study the secure grouping protocols and de-
sign private grouping protocols, namely PrivTPG, PrivEPG, PrivBFG, and PrivCFG. 
We conclude this dissertation i Chapter 5.
2
Chapter 2: Encryption-Based Private Authentication
2.1 Related Works 
2.1.1 Security and Privacy in RFID Applications 
 In all the RFID systems, an RF reader identifies individual tags by an Aloha-
based or tree-waking-based query-and-response [25]. The signal from the reader to 
tags is called the forward channel; the signal from the tags to the reader is called the 
backward channel. Defending the forward channel is relatively easy, since the queries 
form a reader can be easily randomized [37]. On the other hand, designing backward 
channel protection mechanisms is non trivial work due to the computational weakness 
of RF tags. 
Different RFID applications require different types of the backward channel pro-
tection mechanisms. For example, Czeskis et al. [8] develop a motion signature to 
counteract a man-in-the-middle variant, so-called the ghost-and-leech. Saxena et 
al. [34] introduce tag activation, where a tag would not reply to a reader's query 
until it is unlocked by the smartphone of the tag's owner. Sakai et al. [30, 32] design 
jamming-based backward channel protection mechanism with bit encoding schemes. 
One of the advantages of their schemes i that no shared secret is required before 
interrogations. This can be achieved by the jamming-based technique, called privacy 
                        3
masking [6]. For example, when a tag sends a 4-bit string, say 1001, the reader (or a 
 trusted masking device) simultaneously ends a mask, say 1011. Under the assump-
tion of the additive channel, the reader and/or an eavesdropper r ceives 10X1, where 
X denotes a corrupted bit. From the received bits 10X1, the legitimate reader with the 
mask information can recover the original bit string from the information about the 
mask bits. On the other hand, an eavesdropper without he mask information cannot 
recover the original bit string. By doing this, a tag can securely transmit abit string 
to the reader as long as at least one bit is corrupted. Based on this idea, randomiza-
tion and encoding schemes are incorporated in [30]. The protocol in [32] also relies 
on jamming-based nvironment, but works on weaker physical layer assumptions in 
the sense that the jamming model relies on the existing physical layer technologies. 
While these security mechanisms aim to protect RF tag embedded smart cards or de-
vices, they cannot be applied to large-scale R,FID systems. This is because bit-by-bit 
operations as well as additional devices for privacy masking are required, which are 
too expensive to manage a number of objects with tags. In fact, to securely identify 
a tag, each bit must be encoded into a codeword with length being longer than or 
equal to 4-bit, i.e., the communication cost increases by at least four times. Then, the 
each codeword must be masked by privacy masking or jamming. In addition, all the 
aforementioned authentication schemes assume that no tag is physically tampered. 
Secure grouping protocols are proposed in [17], which ensure the indistinguish- 
ablies among tag's IDs and groups. In [5], a generic framework for detecting various 
anomalies and attacks, such as missing tags due to theft, cloned tags, targeted attacks, 
and so on. As a privacy preserving RFID protocol, akey-tag tracking algorithm to es-
timate the number of a small set of key tags among all the tags in the system without
4
 disclosing tag's IDs in [20]. However, none of [17, 5, 20] provides any authentication 
mechanism. The most related works to this paper is the private tag authentication 
protocol design for the object management in large-scale RFID systems, which is 
elaborated on the next subsection. 
2.1.2 Private Authentications Protocols 
  To protect the backward channel, or tag's replies, a number of authentication 
protocols with light-weight cryptographic operations have been proposed in the past. 
Weis proposes Hash-lock [36], where atag computes a hashed ID using its unique key, 
and then, replies the hash to a reader. The reader communicates back-end server for 
searching the pair of the tag's ID and unique key corresponding to the tag's reply. 
The reader must search all the pairs of a tag ID and a unique key, which causes 
authentication to take a long time. This motivates private authentication to have 
structured key management. 
  Private authentication protocols with structured key management [14, 29, 24, 21, 
38, 31, 35] use one unique key and a set of group keys. A tag's reply contains a 
set of hash values each of which is computed using the unique key and one of group 
keys. In the authentication phase, A reader first scans the group keys to confine the 
search space of the unique key. As shown in Figure 2.1, the tree-based authentication 
schemes [24, 21] use a balanced tree for the key management. The tags in the system 
are located at leaf nodes in the tree. Each tag obtains the unique key, denoted by sk, 
from its leaf node and the set of group keys, denoted by gk, at the non-leaf nodes on 
the path to the root. Starting from the root, the reader identifies a tag by traveling
5
 the tree toward the corresponding leaf node. Hence, authentication speed of the tree-
based protocols is O(logk N), where N is the number of tags and k is the balancing 
factor of the tree. However, should some tags be compromised and group keys be 
correlated, the system anonymity significantly decreases. 
  Improving anonymity is equivalent to making the correlation probability as small 
as possible. To this end, Lu et al. [22] use a sparse tree, where the number of non-leaf 
nodes are much larger than the number of tags. However, this approach increases 
the height of a tree causing to unacceptable storage cost to tags. Sun et al. [35] 
incorporates the idea of random walking over a skip list, which is a probabilistic tree-
like structure consisted of a set of lists. By taking random shift at each level of skip 
lists and incorporating the dependency among levels, two tags are never linked unless 
they have exactly the same set of group keys. 
There exists a faster authentication protocol, e.g., ETAP [3] and its extended 
version [4], which runs in 0(1) by mapping hashed IDs and real IDs using a hash 
index. Their claim relies on that the random access of a hash index provides the 0(1) 
access. However, this is the average performance, and hash-based protocols may take 
0(n) in the worst case. Hence, this direction is out of our scope. 
  Recently, some mutual authentication protocols for application-specific context 
have been proposed. In [23], Luo et al. propose Succinct and Lightweight Authen-
tication Protocol (SLAP) as an ultralight RF1D protocol, which does not require for 
tags to implement any pseudorandom function generator. While such a class of pro-
tocols is desirable for the RFID systems with low-cost tags, according to the EPC 
Global standard [101, tags may implement a random or pseudorandom number gener-
ator. Thus, we may still rely on the assumption of the availability of pseudorandom
6
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Figure 2.1: An example of tree-based protocols.
generators for protocol designs. The protocol proposed in [12] is primarily designed 
for healthcare applications. Farash et al. [12] improve the existing solution [40] in 
terms of the forward security and untraceability by applying Ecliptic curves to the 
RFID mutual authentication. However, computing the public key operations incurs 
heavy burden for tags. In [13], Gope et al. study a lightweight authentication pro-
tocol for distributed IoT applications in smart city. Their protocol not only protects 
the forward security, anonymity, and tag access traces, but also the location of RFID-
embedded objects/devices. The works [12, 40, 13] ensure the security and privacy in 
application-specific environments such as medical systems and IoT applications. In 
contrast, our study focuses on the RFID-based large-scale object management, e.g., 
inventory management, RFID library, etc., using data structures for key management.
7
2.1.3 Cryptographic Operations for RFID systems 
  Since RF tags are computationally weak devices, only lightweight cryptographic 
 operations are feasible at tags. According to the EPC standard [10],  the 16-bit pseudo-
random number generator shall be implemented in all passive RF tags. To this end, 
Poschmann et al. developes Data Encryption Standard Lightweight (DESL) [27], 
which requires only 1,848 gates. Using a DES type s-box and the XOR operations, a 
lightweight short hash function is proposed by Jappinen et al. in [15]. A pseudoran-
dom function can be implemented with the aforementioned low-cost operations by an 
8-bit shift register with an XOR feedback loop [39]. 
2.1.4 Physical Layer Issues in RFID Systems 
EPC Global Gen 2 standard operates in the 860 MHz - 960 MHz UIIF range, and 
the IS018000-4 standard operates in the 2.4GIIr ISM band. The chennel conditions 
by an RFID system significantly affect he performance of RFID protocols, which can 
be modeled by the product of distance-dependent average path loss law, variation in 
the local mean power (shadow fading), and small-scale fading. In [33], an additive 
model for shadow fading is proposed. Path loss and multipath propagation character-
istics are studied in the UHF band in [26]. In [7], the characterization of large-scale 
fading is investigated in an obstacle-dense environment, a shadow depth calculation 
method is invented. 
Since the focus of this paper is on the protocol-level security in RFID systems, a 
reader and tags are assumed to be able to communicate each other without frame-level 
errors. Therefore, the impact of channel conditions is out of our scope.
8
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Figure 2.2: An example of skip graphs.
2.2 Preliminary 
2.2.1 Anonymity 
 In many RFID applications, anonymity {35j is widely used as a privacy metric 
which quantifies the state of not being identifiable within an anonymous set. That 
is, the replies of the tags in the same anonymous set are indistinguishable from each 
other. 
Consider that an RFID system with 8 tags are maintained by a binary tree struc-
ture as shown in Figure 2.1. As long as an authentication protocol is secure, the 
replies form any tags in the system are not distinguishable from each other. In other 
words, an adversary can identify a tag with probability of no greater than random 
guessing, i.e., 1/8, by eavesdropping the tag's reply. However, should one of the tags 
be compromised, anonymity of the other tags will decrease. For example, assume 
that tag 5 with unique key sk5 and group keys GK5 = {gk1,1, gk2,2} iscompromised.
9
 Then, the replies from the other tags will be partially disclosed from the keys associ-
ated with tag 5. As a result, an adversary can divide the uncompromised tags into 3 
disjoint sets, i.e., {0, 1, 2, 3}, {4}, and {6, 7}. These tags are anonymous within one 
of three sets, and thus, the adversary can identify them with probability of either 1, 
0.5, or 0.25. 
2.2.2 Skip Graph 
A skip graph {11 is a probabilistic data structure, which has the full functionality 
of a balanced tree and consists of a set of ordered doubly linked lists as shown in 
Figure 2.2. In other words, a skip graph can be seen as a set of trees. Each level, 
except the lowest level (labeled by level 2), has one or more lists, and the lowest level 
has one list containing all the nodes. Every node participates to one of the lists at 
each level. A node in the list at level i for i > 0 appears at level i—1 with probability 
of 1/k, where k is the balancing factor. Given the number of inputs N, the number 
of levels, denoted by 1 , is defined as 77 = [logk Ni, Thus, there are lists at level j
on average. The operations ofsearch, insert, and delete are performed in O(logk N). 
The space complexity is O(N log N). 
2.3 Skip Graph-Based Authentication 
2.3.1 Motivations and Basic Idea 
  To the best of our knowledge, the use of random walking over a data structure, 
e.g., RSLA [353, achieves the highest degree of privacy among the existing works. 
In this approach, the correlation probability depends on the number of levels and 
the number of internal nodes at each level. In the tree-based and skip lists-based 
protocols, the number of levels is defined as 71 = [log, Ni. The number of nodes 
                          10
 at level i is defined as ki. Hence, the correlation probability can be obtained by 
11rbbgk Ni-1 I  i=1kx 
  One naive approach to decrease the correlation probability is the use of sparse 
structures [22j, i.e., the internal nodes in a data structure is much larger than the 
number of tags. However, introducing redundant internal nodes is undesirable. The 
number of group keys that each tag stores increases in proportion to the number of 
levels of a data structure. In general, the passive tag has 512-bit memory, and the 
length of a tag's ID is 96 bits. Assuming that the length of a unique key and a group 
key is 32 bits, the number of levels can be at most 13, (which can be derived by 
(512 — 96)/32 = 13. The number of tags which can be supported by this approach is
much smaller than 213 when the structure issparse. Therefore, increasing the number 
of levels of a key structure is not practical for large-scale RFID systems. 
  To tackle this issue, we propose Randomized Skip Graph-based Authentication 
(RSGA), which runs in D(logk N). The overview of the proposed RSGA is as follows. 
First, a skip graph with ri + 1 levels is deterministically constructed in which unique 
keys are located at the nodes in the list at level r1 and the group keys are located at 
the nodes in the list at level j (1 C j C — 1). Then, each tag is associated with 
a node of the lowest level ist. Starting from the bottom, a tag obtains the unique 
key and a set of group keys along the path toward the top level ist. At each level, 
random shifting is performed (hence, the protocal is randomized). In the singulation 
process, the reader will find the node corespoinding to a tag's reply in the lowest 
list by trveling from the top. The proposed RSGA differs from RSLA [35] in the 
initialization, key issuing, private authentication phases, and key updating. For the
11
Table 2.1: Definition of notations.
Symbols Definition
 k 
 N 
    vi, V 
ski 
    ptr 
nt, nr 
( ), E(•), D(•)
The balancing factor of a skip graph 
The number of tags in the system 
The number of levels of a skip graph, [Iogk Ni 
The 1-th list at level j in a skip graph (0 C j < 77) 
Node i in a list, and a set of nodes 
Tag i's unique secret key 
A set of group keys of tag i, {gki, gk2i ..., gk t_1 } 
A set of shift numbers of tag i, {r1i r2, ..., rn_1} 
The index of the list at level 1 
Nonces from a tag and a reader 
A tag's reply, 1/31, (32 i ..., ~3,t_z}and 'y 
The hash, encryption, and decryption functions
system maintenance, the similar approaches in [21 
phase is elaborated on in the subsequent sections. 
2.3.2 Definitions and Assumptions
, 35) can be applied to RSGA. Each
  We assume that an RFID system consists of N tags and one reader, which is 
connected tothe back-end server. In addition, the reader and back-end server are as-
sumed to be connected via a secure channel. Hence, the reader is the final destination 
of all the tags. 
The nonces are randomly selected by the reader and a tag, which are denoted by n, 
and nt, respectively. The hash function H(.) is assumed tobe collision resistant, and 
an encryption function E(.) is implemented by low-cost cryptographic operations [36]. 
In addition, the pseudo random family (PRF) is defined as F(.) which returns a 96
12
bits value. We assume that RF reader has enough computational power to run a 
 decryption function DO.  ). The symbols used in this paper is listed in Table 2.1. 
2.3.3 The Proposed Authentication Protocol 
Construction of A Skip Graph 
Given the number of tags N and the balancing factor k, a skip graph with + 1 
levels is generated, where 7/ is defined as [logk Ni. There exits one list in the lowest 
level, which contains all the nodes, so that every tag can be allocated. At level j
(1 < j < --- 1), there are kri-i lists and each of them contains /0 ; nodes. To form a 
list, node vi has pointers to the right and left nodes in the same list at level j , which 
arc denoted by vi.right[j] and vi.le f t[j]. The left pointer of the head node and the 
right pointer of the tail in the list are null. Let L/be the 1-th list at the j-th level 
from the top. For all the level, node vi belongs to list Li,z, where I is computed by 
i mod ki7-3. The level 0 has one list which contains node vp, and this is used as the 
entry point for key searching. 
Each node has a key for each level. Let vi . key [j ] be the variable to store a key at 
node vi. To be specific, vi,key[q] contains unique key ski and vi.key[j] (1 C j C r - 1) 
contains group key gkij. No key is assigned tothe node in level 0 list. Thus, vo.key[0] 
is empty. 
  Since the construction of a skip graph is deterministic, our skip graph with the 
balancing factor k works in the same fashion to a set of k-balanced trees with the 
nodes in the lower levels belonging to more than one tree. For example, Figure 2.3 
shows a skip graph with N = 8 and k = 2. The corresponding set of binary trees are 
shown in Figure 2.4.
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Algorithm  1 KeyIssue()
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11: 
12: 
13: 
14: 
15: 
16: 
17: 
18: 
19: 
20: 
21: 
22: 
23: 
24: 
25: 
26:
/* Key Issuer does following */ 
Issuer locates all tags t to node vi 
/* For each tag t, Key Issuer does following */ 
for each tag t in the system do 
Keylssue(t, vi) 
/* The function to assign keys to tag t */ 
Keylssue(t, vi) 
/* vi is the current node */ 
Rt= I* Initialize the random shift numbers list */ 
Gift /* Initialize the group keys list */ 
~ * At the lowest level ist 4,0 */ 
skt vi . key [r]] 
/* A parent is randomly chosen among k — 1 nodes */ 
nuniform [O,k — 1] 
vi vp where p = (i — nk't-j ) mod N 
for (j from 77 — 1 to 1) do 
/* Random shifting by r and add a group key */ 
 rrinifarm. {O,I Lj1 - 11 
                t Add rtoR# 
v~-shift to the left by r 
Add vi.key[j] to GK1 
I* Move to upper level */ 
  rZ ;------------urcifarm[0, k — 1] 
vi+-vp where p = (i — nk't^1 ) mod N 
j4-j-1 
ptr 4— vi
Key Issuing 
  In RSGA, every tag has four variables, the unique key ski, a set of group keys 
CKt, a set of random shift numbers Rt, and list index ptr. Tag t is located at one 
of the nodes, say vi, in the list at level r~, and the unique key at vi.key[7q]is a signed 
to tag t. A set of group keys are assigned to tag t by traveling with random shifting 
from vi at level 77 to the top of the skip graph. At level j, node vi has a set of parents,
14
 denoted by Vd , since there are more than one lists at level j (1 C j C rr - 1).  Here, 
V,3 includes k nodes, vp for p = (i - nl l-i) mod N (0 C n C k -- 1). The key issuer 
randomly selects one of the node in Vd and moves to the upper list 4 _1,1 to which 
node v, belongs at level j - 1. Then, random number ri E [0, N - 1] is generated 
and the left shift by ri is taken. If the pointer eaches to the head node in the list, it 
moves to the tail. The value of r, is added to Rt for the j-th level. The pointer is now 
at a node, say u , at level j 1. The group key at v .key[j -1] is added to GKt. This 
process repeated until the pointer reaches at the top list. Unlike a tree and skip lists, 
there are more than one node at level 1. Thus, the entry point of the skip graph, i.e., 
the ID of list L1,1 at level 1, is kept in ptr. At the end of this process, tag t has one 
unique key, rr - 1 group keys, rr - 1 shift number, and ptr. The pseudocode of key 
issuing is presented in Algorithm 1.
Level 0 
Level I
Level 2
Level 3
I-lead
vo
Tail
 k  iV31gk3.1
1 11 - - - Vslgk
V_ck_]{V'k'
Volg ko .0k4
30k3 kr
Q
 jV7 gk,
nigkn k <~gka
_ _ ) 2~
Vo sko fiV, ski f1Vx~sk2 liV3~sk3IVV4sk,~V5sk5~VssksVsk7
Figure 2.3: An example of key issuing.
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 Example Figure 2.3 illustrates a skip graph key structure with k = 2 and ri  = 3 of 
an RFID system with 8 tags. All tags are located at one of the nodes in the lowest 
level list L3,1. The key issuer assigns group keys and random shift numbers to a tag, 
say tag 3, by traveling the skip graph starting from v3 in L3,1 to the root as follows. 
First, unique key sk3 at v3.key[3j isassigned to tag 3. According to Figure 2.3, v3 has 
two parents nodes v2 and v3 at level 2. Assume that the key issuer randomly selects 
r2 = 2 and the random shift number is added to R3. The current pointer shifts to 
the left by 2 and will be at v6 in L2. Next, tag 3 obtains group key gk6,2 stored in 
v6. key[2] . This process i repeated until the pointer eaches L0. Assume that the key 
issuer selects aparent node v6 at level 1 and tag 3 selects r1 = 1 at level 1. At last, 
v2 (the head node in the list to which v6 belongs in level 1) is stored at ptr as the 
entry point to the skip graph. Eventually, tag 3 obtains k3a {gk2,1, gk6,2}, 
R3={1,2}, and ptr=v2.
( root
(a) Tree 1 
 (root_.)
(c) Tree 3. 
 Figure 2.4:
root
The corresponding set 
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(b) Tree 2. 
 root:)
(d) Tree 4, 
of trees.
Mutual Authentication 
  After issuing keys, the reader can securely communicate with tags. In the RSGA 
 authentication protocol, the reader first sends a query with nonce nr, then a tag 
generates a reply with nonce nt and sends the reply. The reader receives and decrypts 
the tag's reply. 
  The replying process at the tag's side is as follow. Assume tag t has the unique 
key ski, a set of group keys GK = {gk1, gk2, ..., gk,t_1 }, a set of random shift numbers 
Rt = {Pi, r2, ..., r,1_1}, and the pointer ptr. When tag t receives a query with nonce nr 
from the reader, tag t generates a reply message with nonce nt. The reply message is 
defined by ptr, /3 — {01, ^82,  .,. i,t-1}, and 'y. The value of f3j consists of a hash value 
83i.hash and encrypted shift number, i.e., /3i = (,3i.hash, /3j.num), where 8.jhash = 
H(gk~~~ra-1 IntI nr) and /3 .num = E(gk3I Irj). 
At level 1, j31.hash iscomputed with the base r0 = ptr. The reason why the shift 
number is included at the previous level is to enforce dependency among the levels to 
preserve high anonymity. The random shift number rjis encrypted by E (gk3 Ilrj ) and 
set to f;.num. While each component of[3 is computed using a group key at each 
level i, and 7 is computed using a unique key at level r1. The value of 7 is obtained 
by IDt F(01 skt f J r~7_ 1 [ [nt [Inr), where IDt is the ID of a tag and R.) is the PRF. 
As the input of F(.), 0 is concatenated with other parameters for the purpose of the 
mutual authentication. Finally, tag t sends nt, C3, 7, and ptr to the reader. Note 
that /9 contains rl — 1 elements. The pseudocode of the tag's reply is provided in 
Algorithm 2. 
  On receiving tag t's reply, the reader scans k group keys associated tothe nodes in 
list L1,r,tr. Let vi be the node whose key[1] contains the corresponding group key gk1 
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Level 0 
 Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Head
Vfl
Tail
--r~'~V3lgka.~
 qv K V$Igks
V7gk7
Vslgk1
Vjgko 4L1
Vjgk5
3Igk3 51g~5 719k7
oIg ko 20kz.J' 41gk4 Blgke
 v
V,IskoV,Isk, V21sk2 H V 3lsk3 HV 4lsk4 H V51sk5 H V,Isk6V,isk,
Figure 2.5 : An example of authentication.
for f1.hash. In addition, 131.nwcm is decrypted by gk1 to obtain shift number r1. The 
pointer moves to v. in 4,1, and then right shift is token by r1. If the pointer reaches 
at the tail node in the list, it moves to the head node of the same list. This process is 
repeated until the pointer arrives in a node in the lowest level ist. Since the nodes in 
the lowest list contains the unique key, the reader can identify the corresponding tag 
based on the information in the signature 'y. The pseudocode of tag authentication 
is given in Algorithm 3. 
  After the tag identification, the mutual authentication process is kicked off. Note 
that the mutual authentication process of the RSGA is basically the same as the 
exiting ones [24, 35]. At the end of singulation, the reader knows IDt and ski. The 
reader computes 7 = IDt F(I E I.skt`jrit j Inr) and scuds it to tag t. On receiving 7, 
tag t computes ID; by ID; = B F(11 1skt, If ID equals to tag t's IDt, tag 
t accepts the reader. By doing this process, tag t also authenticates the reader.
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Example Figure 2.5 presents an example of how tag 3 is authenticated by the reader. 
 Assume that tag 3 has sk3, GK3 = {gk2,1, gk6,2}, R3  = {1, 2} and ptr=v2. On 
receiving a query from the reader, tag 3 will generates nounce nt and computes its 
reply, 0 and y, as follows:
= H(gk2,11Intl lnr), E(gk2,1, 1)(2.1) 
i32H(gk6,2 E(gk6,2, ) (2.2) 
= ID3 F(9I I5k3I I2I nt IInr)(2 .3) 
When the reader receives the tag's reply nt, 0, y, and ptr, it tries to search the 
corresponding entry at the bottom list in a skip graph. As shown in Figure 2.5, 
there are four lists at the first level. The reader selects the one indicated by ptr. 
To compare the obtained hash value with /31.hash, two nodes v2 and v6 in L1,2 are 
scanned, each of which contains gk20. and gk6,1, respectively. Since the key gk2,1 is 
the valid key for f1.hash, the reader executes D(gk2,1,f1.num) and obtains r1 = 1. 
The reader moves the pointer to v6 by taking the right shift by 1. In the level 2, 
two group keys at v3. key {2] and v6 .key [2] are scanned to identify the valid key for 
/32.hash. The reader will figure out that gk6,2 works for ,32.hash and obtains r2 = 2 
by decrypting02.num. This process i repeated and at the end the reader reaches the 
lowest level ist L3,1. At this level, the unique keys stored at v2 .key [3] and v3. key [3] 
are scanned. The value obtained with sk3 yields the same value as y. The reader 
computes ID' = ry F (9 II sk3 l I r,,_ i I I nt I nr) and validates that ID' equals to ID3. As 
v3 is the corresponding node at which tag 3 is located and ID' is tag 3's ID, the 
reader finally concludes that the reply comes from tag 3. 
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  For the clarification, the pointers to the right and left nodes in the same level is 
 used for random  shifting, but nothing to to do with key scanning. When the reader 
moves the current pointer toward the bottom list in the authentication process, the 
corresponding child nodes of the current node are scanned. In this example, the 
current pointer is located at v6 in level 1, and its children v0 and v6 in level 2. It 
will be clearer by seeing both Figures 2.4 and 2.5. As discussed, the skip graph in 
Figure 2.5 can be seen a set of 4 binary trees as shown in Figures 2.4 (a), (b), (c), 
and (d). Node v6 at level 1 belongs to list L1,2 and has two children v0 and v6 at 
level 2, which corresponds to Figure 2.4 (c). This is why the reader scans vo .key [2] 
and v6.key[2] in level 1. A similar argument holds for key scanning at v2.key[3] and 
v3.key[3] ofL3,1 in level 2. 
  After identifying tag 3, the mutual authentication phase is kicked off. The reader 
computes the proof 7 by ID3 e F(11 t.sk311nf H  ) and sends 7 to tag 3. This time, 
1 is concatenated with the input. On receiving the response from the reader, tag 3 
performs 7 ® .F(111,43Ilrat+170 and resulted value will be ID3. Since the legitimate 
reader has the correct ID3 and sk3, the value of ID3 computed by tag 3 shall be the 
same as ID3. At the end of this process, tag 3 also authenticates the reader. 
2.3.4 Key Updating Algorithm 
  To alleviate the compromise attack, the RFID systems should periodically update 
the unique and group keys. The unique keys are never shared by different tags, and 
so the updating of unique key is trivial. Upon accessing a tag, the reader and tag 
update the unique key in its key structure and the tag's memory. The challenge of 
designing a key updating mechanism is how to update group keys. On one hand, 
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 Algorithm 2 RcplyToReader(nr)
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9:
/* Assume tag t has ski, GKt, lit, and ptr *I 
/* where GKt = {gki, gk2, ..., gk1} and Rt = {ri, r2, •.., r71-1} *1 
Generate nonce nt 
for i from 1 to 77- 1 do 
/3i.hash +- H(gki I* Note that r0 = ptr *I 
/3 .rium E(gki, r1) 
Add /32to/3 
y = IDt E F(OJIskt[Irri---iIlntllnr) 
reply nt„(3, y, and ptr.
Algorithm 3 Authentication(nr, nt, /3, y, ptr)
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11: 
12: 
13: 
14: 
15: 
16: 
17: 
18: 
19: 
20: 
21:
/* /3 = {013 132s ..., /377-11 and y*I 
vi 4- v0 /* Here, vi is the current node */ 
for j from 1ton-1do
if1<j<rt-2then 
for m from 1 to k do 
vi the m-th node in Ll,ptr •
if H(vi.key[j + = /3j.hash then 
r - D(vi.key[ j + 1],13i .num) 
v, 4- shift to the right by r 
mf-m+1 
else 
 for m from 1 to k do 
vi 4- the m-th node in L1,1 
/* Computing the signature y */ 
if IDt = -y 6 F(O1 r77-11 nt l]nr) then 
Identify tag t by the IDt and the unique key vi.key[rr] 
     return tag t 
m4- n+1 
j4-j+1 
if The key is not found then 
return FAIL
SPA [21] first updates the group keys at tags, and then, the corresponding group keys
at the back-end server are updated. On the other hand, RSLA [35] first updates all
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the group keys in skip lists, and then, the group keys of individual tags are updated 
when they are accessed. 
  The key updating algorithm we proposed in this paper is based on one in the 
RSLA. First, the key issuer randomly generates nonce r and updates all the keys in 
the skip graph by scanning every node of each list at each level. Here, nonce r is 
 kept in secret by the key issuer. At each node, the key issuer performs H(r, v.key[jj) 
(1 C j C n) to generate a new key. Hence, it is computationally hard for an adversary 
to obtain a new key, because the new key is created by a one-way hash function. For 
the reader to interrogate the tags with old keys, the old keys must be kept until 
all the tags associated with the old keys obtain the new keys. To this end, the 
old key at a node, say v.v.keyf j] (1 C j C r7), is stored at v.old_key[j]. As shown 
in Algorithm 1, when the reader accesses a tag, the tag's unique key, group keys, 
random shift numbers, and the list pointer are updated at the tag's side. Tags will 
keep only the latest set of keys and random numbers, and thus, the old ones will be 
discarded when they are updated. Accordingly, the proposed key updating algorithm 
can successfully renew the keys in the system while the reader can still access tags 
with the old keys. 
2.3.5 Path Pruning 
  To quickly singulate a tag, we propose a path pruning algorithm based on the 
observation in which the reader does not always have to scan all the group keys. 
Let GKt = {gki i gk2, ..., gk.,r_ 1 } be the set of group keys of tag t. For all the other 
tags, say t', if there is level j such that {gk1, gk2, ..., gkj} {gel, gk'2, ..., gk~ }, then 
{gki, gk2, ..., gki} is the unique subset of group keys with respect to all the other tags.
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 This implies that the reader can singulate tag 1 without scanning ki+i, gkj+2, ..., 
and gk77_1. Let v and v' be the corresponding ode at level j to group key gkj and 
level ri to unique key sk~7, respectively. A shortcut from v to v' is stored at v.pp[j]. By 
doing this, the reader can quickly identify tag t than the original protocol. Note that 
this algorithm never scarifies the degree of privacy against the compromise attack, 
since the shortcut information is never disclosed to adversaries unless the back-end 
server is compromised. The pseudo code of the proposed path pruning algorithm is 
given in Algorithm 4. 
  Note that the existing solutions, e.g., the tree-based and skip lists-based protocols, 
cannot benefit from the path pruning. In both of these approaches, there are ki 
internal nodes at level j. The unique subset of group keys is rarely seen for j > ?I— 1. 
Therefore, one of the advantages of RSGA over the existing solutions is compatibility 
with the path pruning.
Algorithm 4 InitPathPruning()
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11: 
12: 
13: 
14:
For each tag t, call PathPruning(t, GKt, 
/* Here, vt is the node at level ri to whic 
PathPruning(t, GKt, vt) :
m 4--- 1 
for each t' (t' t) do 
count 4— 1 
for each j from 0 to?I--1 do 
if gki = gej then 
     count <— + 1 
   if m < count then 
m 4- count 
ifmCr)-1then 
v the node with gkm. 
v.pp[m] 4— vt.
vt) 
h tag t is assigned. *~
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Example Assume that there are two tags in the system, tags 1 and 2, and each of 
 them has the group keys GK1 = {gk2,i, gk6,2i gk4,3} and GK2 = {gk2,1, gk1,2, gk5,3}, 
respectively. Also, tag l's secret key is assumed to be stored at v3. While the group 
keys of GK1 and CK2 at level 1 are the same, the second group keys are different from 
each other, i.e., gk6,2 gk4,3. Thus, the subset of tag l's group keys {9k2,1, gk6,2} is
unique with respect to the others. Node v6 stores gk5,2 at level 2, and tag 1 is mapped 
to v3. Therefore, the shortcut from level 2 to level 4 can be stored by v6.pp[2] v3.
Head Tail
Level
0
 V,
 Level
1
gkr, gk,s _,
v„
v,
gk„
v,,
9k„
v, v,
Vg
 gam„ V,,
gka_i gk„
V,
gkz., ^ gk,0 V„
gk,,
v, V,
gko
1-----
n
~_gkBa.
Level
2
(3) V, V„
 gk,, gk~2 gk„ gk,s
V, Vo Vf3
19k,2 gks~ gk„ gku2Vz V, V14,
gka.a gka. gk,a.z gk1,,zV4 V, V„
gkox gk„ gk„ gk,2 
Level
3
V, V3 vs ^ vs Vg V„ V, 3 V~
9k,3 gka,1 gks.a ^ gkB~ gk,,y gk,L1
V, V, V, V, V„ V„
 
I gka,a gki3 4 ~. .,3 gkR.3 gk,a 3 gk„3 gk„,
Level
4
1 "e 1 ~ v2 I 3 v. v, 1 v,n1f •„ I Iv,, I"1al I '",,l
ska sk,I sk2 sk3 Isk,I sksI sk, sk,HkSK Sk1skidSK sk12 SK sk,s
Figure 2.6: An example of the path pruning.
24
2.4 Analyses 
  In this section, security and performance analyses are provided in terms of the 
system anonymity, he key storage cost at the back-end sever and tags, and the 
number ofgates required at tags. 
2.4.1 Anonymity Analysis 
  In RSGA, two tags cannot be correlated unless they have the same group keys at 
all the levels in a skip graph. The correlation probability of RSGA can be deduced 
by Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1 Given the number of tags N and the balancing factor k, the correlation 
 probability of RSGA is (1 ) [l°gk~v7 -1. 
Proof A skip graph as rl = rlogk Ni levels excluding level 0with each containing 
N nodes. Every tag obtains rj — 1 group keys from level j (1 C j C rl — 1), and two 
tags will have the same group key with probability 1/N from level 1to rl — 1. Thus, 
the two tags are correlated with probability ( k )rl°gk N1-1. This concludes the proof. 
The anonymity of the system is defined by Equation 2.4, where Si is the anony-
mous set consisting of one or more tags. 
                        i• 
              N~Szl(2.4) 
                                      If no tag is compromised, there exists only one anonymous et and = N and 
the anonymity ields 1. Should some tags be compromised, the tags in the system are 
divided into disjoint set and each tag is anonymous within the set, and the resulted 
anonymity will be between 0 and 1. 
                          25
  The definition of anonymity shown in Equation 2.4 is based on the following 
observation. When the tags in the system are divided into small disjoint sets, the 
 degree of privacy of an anonymous set, say Si, with respect to the total number of 
tags i  computed by14.  There arel81number of tags which belong toSi. Thus,li;1 
is weighted by multiplying with ` Si. After taking the summation of them for each 
anonymous set,the average is computed by dividing - .
In RSGA, an uncompromised tag belongs to the anonymous set with size k or 
k — 1 only when it has the same group keys as any of the compromised nodes. Such 
a probability isformulated in Theorem 1. Otherwise, the tag remains anonymous 
within the set with size N — Nc, where IV, is the number of compromised tags. 
2.4.2 The Comparisons with The Existing Solution 
In this subsection, we demonstrate th proposed RSGA achieves the lower cor-
relation probability han one of the existing solutions, RSLA. We first derive the 
correlation probability ofRSLA by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Given the number of tags N and the balancing factor k, the correlation 
probability of RSLA is fl kJ k N1-1 t 
Proof Given the number oftags and the balancing factor, skip lists have 7= log Ni 
levels, and each level j except 0 has one list that contains kinodes with a group key. 
I-knee, the probability oftwo tags having the exactly the same set of group keys is 
fl ~1og~ N1-1 L , This completes the proof. 
  From Theorems 1 and 2, the correlation probability of RSGA is smaller than that 
of RSLA. This can beprovenbyshowingl°igx Ni-i0.l-~1~r~pkN1-1>        PYg~z1~ 
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 Example Assume that the number of tags N = 21° = 1024, the balancing factor 
k = 2, the height of tree 77 = 10. From Theorem 1, the correlation probability in 
RSGA is approximately 8.078 x10-28. On the other hand, the correlation probability 
of RSLA is approximately 2.842 x10-14 by Theorem 2. Therefore, RSGA significantly 
improves the degree of privacy in term of the correlation probability by 10-14. 
2.4.3 The Storage Analysis 
   The key storage cost atthe back-end server is obtained by Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3 Given the number of tags N and the balancing factor k, the number of 
keys in the system is bounded by 0(N log N). 
Proof A skip graph has ri = [logk Ni levels excluding level 0, and there are N nodes 
from level 1 to r7. Note that the list at level 0 does not contain any key, and it is 
excluded from the consideration. Thus, the total number of nodes containing a key 
in the skip graph is N log, N. Therefore, the key storage cost is 0(N log N). This 
completes the proof. 
  While RSGA requires larger storage cost than the existing solutions, which require 
0(N) key storage cost, the back-end server has enough storage capacity. In addition, 
RSGA never sacrifices the authentication speed compared with the tree-based and 
skip lists-based approaches. Thus, we stress that RSGA provides higher a privacy 
preserving mechanism with reasonable k y storage cost. 
Theorem 4 Given the number of tags N and the balancing factor k, the storage cost 
for a tag is bounded by 0(logkN).
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 Proof In a skip graph with 77 levels, one unique key, 71- 1 group keys, 77—  1random 
shift numbers, and list pointer ptr arc assigned to each tag. Since 71 C logk.N + 1, the 
storage cost which each tag incurs is D(log, N). This completes the proof. 
2.4.4 Weight Analysis 
  Based on the weight analysis presented in [35], we can estimate the number of 
gates required to implement our RSGA in a tag as follows. Compared with RSLA, 
the proposed RSGA introduces additional logk, N bits to store ptr, which indicates the 
entry point of a skip graph. As 1-bit memory of a D flip-flop is implemented with 5 
gates, keeping log N-bit information introduces additional 51ogk N gates. With the 
same condition as [35], the number of gates to implement RSGA at a tag is formulated 
by 3576 + 80 x — 1) + Slog N. For example, to maintain 2'6 tags in a skip graph 
with the balancing factor k = 2, the number of additional gates for each tag equals 
to 4,856. Since 1,000 gates costs 1 cent [36], the R,SGA implementation increases 
approximately 5 cents for each tag. However, we claim that additional 5 cents would 
not be a significant issue in the RFID systems, where each tag has a relatively long 
life-cycle, such as library RFID systems. 
2.5 Performance Evaluation 
For the performance evaluation by computer simulations using a self-developed 
simulator in Java, the proposed RSGA is implemented along with the existing solu-
tions, including the tree-based [24], SPA [21], AnonPri [29], and RSLA [35] protocols. 
Note that SPA is a tree-based protocol with a key updating mechanism.
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Table 2.2: The simulation parameters.
Parameters Values
      The number of tags 
     The balancing factor 
     The compromised tags 
Num. of pseudo ID pools (AnonP 
 Num. of pseudo IDs (AnonPri)
 28to214 
2, 4, 8,or 16 
1% to 90% 
1000 
10
2.5.1 Simulation Configuration 
The way we conduct simulations i basically the same as [31, 35, 16] and similar 
to [14, 21, 29]. That is, the focus of our performance evaluation ison the protocol-
level security, and thus, the physical functions of tags are not simulated. A simulation 
experiment is set up by locating one RF reader and 28 to 214 RF tags, which is 
sufficiently large to accomodate a large-scale system, such as inventory management 
and an RFID library. The construction of a key structure and key initialization is 
performed by the key issuing process of each private authentication protocol. Then, 
to emulate the compromise attack, randomly selected NN tags are marked as being 
compromised, where NN ranges 1% to 90% or is set to be either 64, 128, 256 or 512. 
In the tree-based, SPA, RSLA, and RSGA, the balancing factor k is set to be either 
2, 4, 8, or 16. For AnonPri, the number of pseudo ID pools and the number of 
pseudo IDs that each tag has are set to be 1000 and 10, respectively. In order to 
make our performance evaluation consistent with the related works, these protocol-
specific parameters are set as the same as the performance evaluation conducted in 
the existing works [31, 35, 14, 21, 29]. For each system realization, 1000 experiments 
are performed. 
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 We consider both static and dynamic systems. In a static system, after initial-
izing an RFID system, a set of Arc tags are randomly chosen and marked as being 
compromised. Then, the system anonymity is computed. In a dynamic system, ran-
domly selected N tags are marked as being compromised. Then, another set of N 
tags run the key updating algorithm to update their unique key, group keys, shift 
numbers, and the list pointer. This process is repeated to emulate a dynamic system. 
For every iteration, the system anonymity is computed just after a set of NN tags are 
compromised. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 2.2. 
  Under those scenarios, umcompromised tags are interrogated by the reader using 
a private authentication protocol. To compare the performance of each protocol in 
various aspects, the system anonymity, authentication speed, and key storage cost are 
employed as metrics, each of which are computed by exactly the same way as [35]. 
That is, the system anonymity is computed by taking the average of the anonymity 
of each tag as formulated in Equation 2.4; the authentication speed is obtained by 
the summation of the number of light-weight cryoptographic operations including key 
scanning and decryption of shift numbers; the total number of group and unique keys 
in the system is considered as the key storage cost. 
2.5.2 Simulation Results of Static Systems 
  Figure 2.7 shows the system anonymity with the respect to the percentage of 
compromised tags in the case of k = 2. Clearly, RSLA and RSGA, which use a random 
walking over a data structure, outperform the other protocols. The anonymity of 
RSGA is higher than RSLA by 5% N 10% when the percentage of compromised tags 
is between 20% and 60%. This is because the correlation probability of RSGA is much
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smaller than that of RSLA. Hence, RSGA provides the strongest privacy protection 
mechanism against the compromised attack. When the percentage of compromised 
tags is less than 20%, significant difference between RSGA and RSLA is not observed 
 when k = 2. However, as we will show later, RSGA outperforms RSLA for k > 4.
31
  Figures 2.8 and 2.9 demonstrate the system anonymity ofRSLA and RSGA with 
respect o the balancing factor. Since tags have small memory to store keys, and 
 thus, the number of levels of a tree/skip lists/a skip graph is limited. Hence, the 
balancing factor must be set to be large to support more tags. However, the larger 
balancing factor causes lower system anonymity as presented in [351. In fact, as shown 
in 2.8 and 2.9, the system anonymity of RSLA decreases as the value of k increases. 
On the other hand, the proposed RSGA still preserves higher anonymity even when 
k = 16. Therefore, RSGA can scale an RFID system in keeping with higher system 
anonymity, which is one of the most significant advantages of RSGA over the existing 
solutions. 
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  Figure 2.10 presents the authentication speed with respect to the number of tags. 
AnonPri incurs the slowest authentication speed, since it does not run in a logarithmic 
order. The tree-based, RSLA, and RSGA result in similar performance. This is
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 because all of them run in Q (logk N).  Although RSGA w/ PP runs in a logarithmic 
order, the average authentication time is much smaller than log N. In fact, as 
shown in the figure, RSGA w/ PP achieves the shortest authentication speed by 
using shortcuts. Note that the tree-based and RSLA cannot benefit the path pruning 
algorithm as discussed in Section 2.3.5. 
  Figure 2.11 illustrates the storage cost in terms of the number of unique keys and 
group keys in the system. RSGA incurs the most key storage cost among the existing 
solutions. To be specific, the key storage cost of RSGA is 0(N logk N), while that of 
the others is 0(N). However, as shown in the figure, the additional storage cost in 
RSGA is not that significant compared with the others. We claim that unique keys 
and group keys are maintained inthe back-end server which has enough data storage, 
and therefore, the additional key storage cost never discourages the deployment of
the proposed RSGA.
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2.5.3 Simulation Results of Dynamic Systems 
 Figure 2.12 depicts the anonymity of the RFID system in a dynamic scenario for 
different protocols with respect to the percentage of compromised tags. In this setting, 
the balancing factor is set to be k = 2. Note that AnonPri is excluded because it does 
not provide akey updating mechanism. Compared with SPA (a tree-based protocol), 
RSGA and RSLA provides much higher system anonymity. This is because RSGA 
and RSLA randomized key structure. Unlike to the one in a static environment shown 
in Figure 2.7, the difference between RSGA and RSLA is not significant when k = 2. 
However, again we claim that RSGA results in much higher system anonymity for 
k > 4 in a dynamic environment. 
Figures 2.13 and 2.14 illuminate the system anonymity in a dynamic scenario 
for different protocols with respect to the balancing factor. Similar to the static 
scenario, the system anonymity of R.SLA decreases in proportion to the balancing 
factor. On the other hand, the proposed RSGA maintains high system anonymity 
for large value of k. Particularly, when k = 16 and N, = 512 in Figure 2.9, RSGA 
presents significant improvement compared with RSLA. Therefore, our RSGA can 
scale up the RFID system without sacrificing the degree of privacy.
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Chapter 3: Grouping Protocols
3.1 Related Works 
  RFID security and privacy are widely studied for many different RFID-enabled 
applications. The tag's privacy in terms of indistinguishably and unpredictability is 
 formally defined in [18]. The private tag authentication protocols [24] protect ags' 
replies from eavesdropping over several interrogation. In order to achieve fast and 
secure singulation, advanced data structures are employed for key managements, such 
as skip lists-based [35] and hash index-based [3]. Some researches rely on physical 
layer supports for secure tag authentication. In [32], Sakai et al. design a novel 
coding scheme for the secure tag singulation under the privacy masking [30], where 
some portion of a tag's reply is intentionally corrupted by jamming. The ghost-and-
leech attacks, which is the man-in-the-middle like attack, is addressed by motion 
signature in [8]. To avoid unexpected tag accesses, Saxena et al. [34] propose a 
locking/unlocking mechanism, in which a tag must unlocked by the smartphone of
the tag's owner before authentication.
37
3.2 Preliminary 
3.2.1 The Tag Grouping Problem 
  An RFID system consists of one reader and n tags. The set of tags in the system 
 is denoted by T = {t1, t2,  ..., tn}, and they are divided into m groups, denoted by 
g _ {Gi, G2, ..., Gmj. The set of groups are disjoint, and thus, we have ET  `Gi = n. 
To uniquely identify each tag and group, we define IDi as the tag ti's ID and GIDi 
as the group Pi's ID. The reader is assumed to know all tag IDs as well as the group 
ID corresponding to each tag. 
The tag grouping problem is defined by the efficient labeling of all the tags in 
T according to g. Note that the prefix of a tag's ID serves on representing a static 
ID. However, these part cannot be changed once tags are manufactured. In the tag 
grouping problem, some portions of a tag's memory is devoted to store a group ID 
by user's preference. 
3.2.2 Grouping Protocols 
A naive solution for grouping tags is the traditional polling grouping (TPG) pro-
tocol, which is desinged by extending apolling protocol in [28]. In TPG, each tag 
has three state, unlabeled, marked, and labeled. At first, a tag is in unlabeled state. 
In the polling phase, it switches its state to marked. Then, in the labeling phase, 
the reader can write a group ID to the tag with marked state. After labeling, the 
tag's state goes to labeled. This straightforward approach, unfortunately, takes a long 
time. To alleviate this issue, Liu et al. propose a set of grouping protocols, e.g., the 
enhanced polling grouping (EPG) and filtering rouping (FIG) protocols in [19j. In 
EPG, instead of writing a group ID to individual tags with marked state, the reader 
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broadcasts a group ID towards everal tags for simultaneous labeling. By doing this, 
the transmission costs of group IDs in the labeling phase can be minimized. In FIG, 
the Bloom filter is used so that a set of tags change its state from unlabeled to marked 
on one query. With this approach, the transmission costs in both the polling and 
labeling phases are reduced. 
3.2.3 Bloom Filters 
 A Bloom filter [2] is a probabilistic data structure to identify whether or not an 
element is a member of a set. In a Bloom filer, there might be a false positive, but 
false negatives never occur. In other words, on receiving a query, a tag concludes 
that it is possibly in the set or definitely not a member. A query consists of i-bit and 
K different hash functions. At the beginning, all the bits in a filter are set to be 0. 
To add an element (i.e., a tag's ID in this paper) to the filter, K array positions are 
computed by applying K hash functions, and the corresponding K bits in the filter 
is set to be 1. To check whether a tag is included in the filter, K array positions are 
computed. The tag is possibly included in the filter if all the positions corresponding 
to the array equal to 1. Otherwise, the tag is definitely not a member. 
3.2.4 Cuckoo Filter 
A Cuckoo Filter [11] improve on Bloom filters and supports deletion of elements. 
To insert an element into the cuckoo filter, we get two indexes from the hash and its 
fingerprint-based elements. After that, as soon as these indexes are obtained, it inserts 
the fingerprint of the element into one of the two possible buckets corresponding to 
the obtained index. As the cuckoo hash table begins to fill up, we encounter the 
situation that there are no more free 2 indexable indexes into which the element 
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should be inserted. In this case, the elements inthe cuckoo hash table at this point are 
exchanged with other indexes to release the space needed to insert he new element. 
By implementing inserts in this way you can examine the fingerprints in one of the two 
indexable indexes and easily remove the elements from the table if that fingerprint is
present. 
3.3 The Privacy Model 
 In this paper, we address the private tag grouping at the protocol-level, where 
for a given tag an adversary cannot identify the tag's group. In our privacy model, 
an adversary isable to eavesdrop allthe observed information on the communication 
channel between the reader and tags. Note that the internal state of tags, i.e., the 
secret key, is assumed tobe never compromised, since our design aims at achieving the 
protocol-level privacy. In addition, we assumed that the adversary cannot distinguish 
tags based on the physical layer characteristics, e.g., an adversary cannot know which 
tag replies to the reader from the signal strength. 
3.3.1 Privacy Model 
In our privacy experiment, there are one reader R and a set of tags T. Tags are 
divided into disjoint groups, denoted by g. For convenience, wedefine g: ID —+ GID 
as a mapping function from a tag ID to the corresponding group ID, and g(tz) denotes 
the ti's group. The parameters ofa grouping protocol include the number of groups 
m., the mean of a group size 1.1, and the standard variance a. We define II :_ (m, ~.z, a). 
A set of data (e.g., nonce, hashed IDs, and group IDs) transmitted over the wireless 
channel during a grouping protocol is denoted by CU.
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 We assume [Gil > 2 for an indistinguishably-based privacy experiment. According 
to the EPC global standard, every tag shall be equipped with a I6-bit pseudorandom 
generator. Thus, tags are assumed to be able to execute a pseudorandom function 
family (PRF). 
  Wedefine the following random oracles, in which the inputs are not tractable from 
the outputs. 
• InitSys(R, T, g, II) sets up an RFID systems with given parameters. 
• Select(T, g) randomly selects one group G and returns randomly selected two 
tags, to and t1, in G. 
• Grouping(to, t1) selects one of to and t1 by the uniform distribution, i.e., let 
b orm {O, 1 } and tb be the selected tag. Then, the oracle runs a secure 
grouping protocol to tb and returns Cb. Here, C, is a set of values which can be 
    observed in a grouping protocol between R and tb, e.g., nonce, hashed IDs, and 
     so on. 
• Query(T') returns g(ti) for given ti E T — to, t1. Note that T'j is polynomial, 
    i.e., an adversary can queries tags to the oracle polynomial number of times. 
Each oracle is denoted by 0 jnitsys } °Grouping, and °Query, respectively. 
An experiment is denoted by ExpA n(R, T, Q). Adversary A. tries to succeeds the 
following experiment. 
Experiment 1 ExpA n (R, T, g): 
                         1. An RFID system is initialized by0Initsys• 
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 2. Adversary A is given two tags, t0 and t1, both of which belong to the same 
group, from the oracle 0seiect • 
3. Adversary A sends the two tags to Grouping(.) and receives Cb. 
4. Adversary A learns Cz by querying randomly selected tag, t;, polynomial num-
    ber of times. 
5. Adversary A guesses b and determines b' +— {O, 1 }. 
6. If b=h', the experiment outputs 1 (the experiment succeeds) and 0 otherwise. 
  With the aforementioned privacy model, the security of a tag gropingprotocol is 
formally defined as follows. 
Definition 1 (A Private Grouping Protocol) A tag grouping protocol is said to 
be private against polynomial dversaries atthe protocol-level if Equation 3.1 holds. 
Pr [ExpA n(R, T, Q) = 1] C -1 negl(n).(3.1) 
2 Here, n = ` TI and negl(n) is negligible. 
3.3.2 The Limitation of Our Model 
  The proposed privacy model has limitation in its experiment; the two challenge 
tags are selected by the oracle and these tags belong to the same group. If adversary 
A is allowed to select wo tags of her choice, her advantage ofthe experiment will 
not be negligible. For example, A randomly selects t0 and ti. Let Gz be g(t0) and 
Gjbe g(ti ) . Then, Gi C and l G2 I I Gil most likely hold. In this case, the
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A's advantage is absn'~—~G'1)+ negl(n),which is not negligible. Therefore the 
challenge tags are selected by the oracle in our privacy model. 
  In addition, our model does not guarantee the positive and negative membership 
 privacy. That is, given tag t, an adversary can tell whether or not t belong to Gi  with 
a non-negligible probability. Since the size of each group may differ each other, an 
adversary call tell if t is in G or not with non-negligible probability. 
3.4 Private Grouping Protocols 
3.4.1 Motivations and Basic Idea 
  Fast grouping of RF tags achieves quick distribution of group IDs for further 
efficient object monitoring and classifications. However, none of the existing grouping 
protocols does not consider the privacy of tags, where adversaries can identify the 
corresponding group of each tag belonging to. Therefore, in this section, we propose 
four private grouping protocols, namely PrivTPG, PrivEPG, PrivBFG, and PrivCFG. 
  All of them consists of three phases. First, the initialization phase is to exchange 
nonce; second, the polling phase changes tags' state from unmarked to marked, which 
indicates the tag is ready to be categorized; third, the labeling phase assign a group 
ID to individual tags and these tags' state switch to labeled. Each proposed protocol 
differs in their polling phase. The basic idea to preserve tags' privacy is the use of a 
hash function in the polling phase. 
3.4.2 System Parameters 
  We assume that an large-scale RFID system consists of n tags and one reader, 
which is securely connected to the back-end server. We denote the tag set as 7- = 
t1, t2, ..., t,,,}. A set of groups is defined by g = {G1, G2, ..., Gm}, where m is the 
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number of groups. Hence, the total number of tags is the sum of the group sizes, 
i.e., Eirz 1 Gi I=n. Each group Gi has a unique group ID GI.Di (1 C i C m). On 
the system deployment, only an RF reader knows the tag partition g. Hence, an RF 
reader needs to label individual tags based on g. 
3.4.3 The Private TPG Protocol 
We first design a TPG-based baseline protocol, namely private tag polling group-
ing (PrivTPG), which state diagram is shown in Figure 3.1. First, the reader and 
individual tags exchange nonce, r, and rt, each of which is generated by the reader and 
a tag. In the polling phase, the reader sends ahashed ID of tag t, i.e., Hskk (Tr `rt I IIDt) . 
Then, t checks if the hashed value corresponding to its ID, and if so, t changes its 
state to marked. In the labeling phase, the reader sends GIDi (where g(t) = GIDi) 
to t and the tag goes to the labeled state. This process i continue until the reader 
labels n tags.
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 Hence, the execution time of Privacy TPG is { g x (1271+  + J H J }+ tgjd +471+   th }x n, 
where tid is the length of a time slot that ransmits a 96-bit tag ID [9], tgid is the 
length of a slot for transmitting a group ID, r is the length of a nonce, H is the length 
of a hash value, ti„ is the time interval, th is the hash calculation time, and Ti. is the 
number of tags. 
3.4.4 The Private EPG Protocol 
The performance of PrivTPG can be improved by reducing unnecessary broadcast-
ing in the polling phase. To this end, we propose private nhanced polling (PrivEPG), 
which state diagram is illustrated in Figure 3.2. PrivEPG differs from PrivTPG in 
the polling phase. After exchanging once, T., and rt, in the initialization phase, the 
protocol enters the polling phase. For each group Gi (1 C i C m), the reader does 
followings. The reader computes HA, (T J]rt I JI Dt}for tag t3 E Gi and sends it to 
the tag. Tag t3 switches its state to marked, if the hashed query corresponds to the 
one which is computed by itself. Before sending GID , the reader changes the state 
of all the tags in G. . Then, GID1 is broadcasted by the reader. In this approach, 
single transmission of a group ID to label all the tags in the same group is conducted 
for each group in the labeling phase. Thus, the transmission cost can be reduced. 
  The Privacy EPG sends each group ID by broadcasting, the execution time of 
Privacy EPG is fu,-6-x (21r1 + !HI)+tin + th} x n+(tgid + tin) x m, where m is the 
number of groups. Hence, the Privacy EPG can improve the grouping efficiency over 
the Privacy TPG.
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 3.4.5 The Private BFG Protocol 
  We further propose aprivate tag grouping protocol with one of the advanced data 
structures, namely privae Bloom filter-based grouping (Priv.BFG). The state diagram 
of Priv.BFG is presented in Figure 3.3. In the initialization phase, the reader and 
tags exchange nonce, r,, and Tt. 
  In the polling phase, thereader simultaneously changes the state of tags in the 
same group by applying aBloom filter. In this phase, for each group, say Gi the reader 
executes the followings. First, a Bloom filter with length and K hash functions is 
initialized. Let ilk be the k-the hash function (I < k C K). When a tag, say t, is 
added to the filter, a pseudo ID is used as an entity instead of IDtj . Let PIDti be 
the pseudo ID of tag t, which defined as PI Dt = Hsk1(r,.! Irt, IDt). Then, the reader 
obtains K array positions of PI Dt in the filter by applying K hash functions and sets 
the corresponding bits to be 1. This process i repeated for each tag in Gi, and the 
reader broadcasts a query with a Bloom filter to tags. On receiving a query, each tag, 
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 say t', does the followings. First, t' compute PIDe from Hskt, (rr firtil IDt• ). Then, 
computes K array positions form K hash functions obtained from the Bloom filter . 
If all the K array positions in the Bloom filter are 1, then t' concludes it is in the 
member and switches its state to marked. Otherwise , t' ignores the filter. 
In a Boom filter, false positive occurs, i.e., tags which are not in Gi might changes 
their state to marked. This can be corrected as follows. The reader knows a set 
of marked tag, denoted by AI, and a set of tags in C . Thus, the tags in Mi — Gi 
should changes their state to unmarked. To this end, reader computes PIDt = 
Ilskt (rr Jirt I l I Dt ) for each tag t in lul2 — Gi and broadcasts he set of PI Ds. On 
receiving query, each tag again computes its PID and goes to the unmarked state if 
it is included in Mi — C. 
. In the labeling phase, the reader broadcasts the group ID, GIDi, to the tags in 
Gi in order to change their state to labeled. This process is repeated until the reader 
labels all the tags. 
Filtering Phase 
  In this phase, an RF reader generates and broadcasts a bloom filter to quickly 
mark each tag in group P. Let Li be the length of the bloom filter in round i, and ki 
be the number of hash functions in round i. An RF reader generates the bloom filter 
taking the false positive into account. The flase positive rate fi in round i is defined 
the following Formula 3.2, where mi is the number of tags in group P . 
              fi=(1-(1-~}i"~`)~`^(1—exp—~m~}~ti(3.2) 
      LiLi 
The minimal value of fi is 0.6185—i where ki= in 2 x m . Hence, the optimal Li and 
 are the following Formula 3.4 and 3.3, where ni is the number of unlabeled tags 
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 at that point. If Li is too long, an RF reader can split it 
transmit each segment in tid. 
                Li=  mz xIn(96x(ln2)2x ni—mi)         0
n 2)2mi
o 96-bit segments, and
(3.3)
ki = ln 2 x Li(3.4) 
mi 
Each unlabeled tag hashes own tag ID to ki bit positions in the bloom filter by using 
ki hash functions. If the all ki bits in the bloom filter are 1, the tag passes the filter 
and transitions to the marked state from the unlabeled state. 
Polling Phase 
  In this phase, an RF reader broadcasts the false positive tag ID. Since an RF 
reader knows the set of marked tag M and set of tags P;, can predict the tags that 
should be unmarked from subset M --- P. Hence, an RF reader broadcasts the tags 
ID in the subset Mi --- P. Each tag that received own tag ID in this phase transitions 
to the unlabeled state from the marked state. 
Labeling Phase 
In this final pahse, an RF reader broadcasts the group ID of Pi, and each marked 
tag transitions to the labeled state from the marked state. 
Execution Time 
The minimal execution time 11(m , ni) in round i is the following Formula 3.5. 
                              (12r'!+ Li)_~+             T(m,i, ni)=ix th.x mi +96xl,id+ tin) (
3.5) 
                                                                                                            L•i• 
~ (ni — mi) x O.6185mi x (tid + tin) + tgid 
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The first member is the time of calculating hash, and the second member is none 
exchange and filtering phase that broadcasts he Li length bloom filter. The third 
member is polling phase that broadcasts ! Mi — Pd tag IDs, where 0.61857-i is the 
minimal false positive rate. The third member is labeling phase that broadcasts he 
group ID of P. 
3.4.6 The Private CFG Protocol 
Finally, we propose a private tag grouping protocol applying the Cuckoo fil-
ter, namely private Cuckoo filter-based grouping(Priv.CFG). The state diagram of 
Priv.CFG is presented in Figure 3.4. In the initialization phase, the reader and tags 
exchange nonce, rr and rt. 
In the polling phase, the reader simultaneously changes the state of tags by apply-
ing a Cuckoo filter. First, a L length cuckoo filter consisting of2 hash functions and 4 
buckets i  initialized, which is denoted as a (2, 4)-cuckoo filter (i.e., each item has two 
candidate buckets, each bucket has up to four fingerprints and the number of buckets 
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 is L) is initialized. Each bucket contains the x's fingerprint  (f bit) and a encrypted 
group ID (GI.Dz e rt rr). After the initialization phase, the RF reader calculates 
the storage destination candidate i and j (0 C i, j < L) of the element x by using the 
Equation (3.6) and the Equation (3.7). The RF reader randomly selects either i or j 
buckets with free space, and then stores a x's fingerprint and a encrypted group ID. 
If bucket i and j have no available space, kick out a previously stored element and 
store it there. The RF reader calculates a relocation destination of the kicked out 
element using by Equation (3.8) and the process repeats again. 
h1(x) = hash(x Irt lErr.)(3.6)
h2(x) = h1(x) el) hasla(x's fingerprint) (3.7)
j e hash(x s fingerprint)(3.8) 
  It is possible to encounter an infinite loop of relocating the elements. Therefore, 
we set an upper limit on the loop of relocation, and we decided to retransmit the 
element that could not be placed by the second small cackoo filter. 
After receiving a cuckoo filter, each tag calculates i and j by by using the Equa-
tion (3.6) and the Equation (3.7). If tag's fingerprint matches the element in the 
bucket, the tag decrypt the group ID and change own state to labeled.
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Figure 3.4: The state diagram of PrivCFG. 
Execution Time 
If the number of entries in the bucket is 4, the execution time 
th x 2 x n + tid9+6t— {21r1 +4L(f + where f is length of finger 
number of bucket. 
False Positive 
The false positive rate E is given by the following Equation (3.9) fr 
bility that the fingerprints match and the probability of using the sar 
    f (1 1 2b 2b 
Optimal Length of Fingerprint 
Consider the construction process of inserting n random items j 
table with bucket size b and the number of buckets m = cn, where c 
Insertion failures occur whenever q = 2b + 1 items are mapped to 
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  of PrivCFG is 
print, L is the 
ber  ket. 
l e itive 
  om the proba-
ility                                                      me two bucket. 
            E= 1——                                                  (3.9)
timal ngth f inge print 
  nsider e nstruction rocess f serting  ndom sinto an empty 
ble ith cket ize  d e ber f ckets   , ere is a constant. 
sertion ilures cur enever a     s re a ped  the same two
buckets. Therefore, the expected number of groups of 2b + 1 items colliding during 
the inserting process is 
      (2b1)(2b1) (2fcn )2b(3.10) 
 In this case, in order to set S2(4*) to 7(1), 4bf must be n. Hence, we set the fingerprint 
size as f — SZ( n) bits. 
Optimal Number of Buckets 
  The average number of bits per item C representing the space fficiency isshown 
by the following Equation (3.11), where a is the load factor. 
                table size f•(# of entries)—f       C — —---------------——bits .(3.11) 
                     71—CY(# of entries) a 
The table size is expressed by the product of the bucket size b, the number of buckets 
L and the number of bits of the fingerprint f.. Hence, the number of buckets i  
           L=
anb(3.12)                                  •
Optimal Bucket Size 
  Figure 3.5 demonstrates amortized space cost per item vs. measured false positive 
rate with different bucket size. As the false positive rate increases, the difference due 
to the bucket size decreases. Since the bucket size 4 is the most space fficient, we 
choose (2, 4)-cuckoo filter. 
3.5 Analyses 
The proposed PrivTPG, PrivEPG, and PrivBFG are private in our privacy model 
defined in Experiment 3.3.1. Due to the space constraint, we only prove the privacy 
of PrivBFG as follow. 
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Figure 3.5: Amortized space cost per item vs. measured false positive rate
Theorem 5 PrivBFG is private against adversaries in Experiment 1.
Proof: To break the privacy of tags, adversary A must be able to tell Cb is generated 
by the interrogation f to or t1, where the set of observed values i  Cb = {rr, rt, f, g(tb)} 
in PrivBFG. 
  Thank to the one-way property of a collision resistant hash function, A can deduce 
neither tb from f without he valid secret key of tb. Thus, A is unable to tell Cb is 
generated by the interrogation ofto or t1. While A can query tags except o and t1 
polynomial number of times, the A's advantage is negligible, which can be proven by 
the reduction to distinguishing a truly random value and one generated by a PRF. 
Let q(n) be the polynomial number of queries that A asks to the oracle 0Q ry. Given 
a queried tag t', the oracle generates random strings, r7.and rt. Then, it computes 
a filter containing the hashed value by H (rr 11411f  Dt, (l skt, }, which is obtained by a 
random function family. Finally, r7., r~, f, and g(t'). For A to link tb and t', the 
hashed IDs with nonce generated by tb and t' must be the same. Let Coll be the 
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 event hat the collision occurs and Pr [Coll] C negl (n) . Thus, the probability that 
A succeeds the experiment is bounded by q(n) x Pr[Coll] C negl(n). Therefore, the 
above claim is true. This concludes the proof. 1 
3.6 Performance Evaluation 
  For the performance evaluation by computer simulations, three private RFID 
grouping protocols, PrivTPG, PrivEPG, and PrivBFG are implemented. 
3.6.1 Simulation Configuration 
  In our simulation experiments, an RFID system consists of one reader and a 
number of tags. The tags are divided into m groups and the number of tags in one 
group is determined by the normal distribution N(1t, a), where u is the mean and 
a is the standard variance. Thus, the total number of tags in the R,FID system 
is computed by n = m x p. For each system parameters, we set 21 C m < 21o, 
10 C ft C 100, and 100 < a C 800, respectively. 
  As the specification f the EPC global Gen-2 standard [91, the tag's ID is set to 
be 96-bit, and hence, the transmission f one tag's ID takes tid = (37.45 x96+302) = 
3897.2ms. Note that one bit transmission costs 37.45/1s with the time interval 302,as. 
The length of a group ID is defined by rlog2 m] , and thus, the transmission ofone 
group ID costs tyid _ (37.45 x rlog2 m.-1 + 302)/2s. For each configuration, 1000 
independent simulations are performed.
54
 Table 3.1: The simulation parameters.
    The number of groups 
 The mean of each group size 
    The standard variance
    The number of tags 
    The length of tag ID 
   The length of group ID 
The transmission time of one bit 
The delay in computing a hash 
     The time interval 
The load factor in cuckoo filter
m = 21 to 2" 
it=10to100 
rr=100to800 
n=mxP' 
96-bits 
[log2 ml 
37.454s 
28077.92ts 
302, is 
95%
800 
   700 
c: 600 
; 500 
H 
  400 
-300 
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   100 
0
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Figure 3.6: The execution time of different protocols.
 3.6.2 Simulation Results
Figure 3.6 s
parameters.
Scenario 1
haws the execution time of different protocols under three set of system
For each
(50,
scenario, a set of system parameters
100, 40), Scenario 2 (100, 100, 100),
(m, a, or) is set to be
and Scenario 3 (100,200, 100),
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Figure 3.8
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: The execution time for different means of the group size.
 respectively. Since the number of tags is determined by N = k x pr, the number of 
tags in each scenario is set to be either 5000, 10000, or 20000. As can be seen from the 
figure, the execution time increases as the number of tags in the system increases. For 
all the scenarios, PrivCFG achieves the faster grouping than the others, and PrivEPG
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result in slightly faster execution time than PrivTPG does. Moreover, PrivBFG 
 and PrivCFG significantly reduce execution time than other methods. Figure 3.6 
implies that the execution time is influenced by various parameters. In the subsequent 
discussion, we will see how m, 0, and a affect the performance. 
  Figure 3.7 presents the execution time with respect to the number of groups m. 
Here, we set n = 214, a = 0, and ,u = Z, respectively. Clearly, the execution time 
of the privacy PrivTPG, PrivEPG and PrivCFG are independent of the number of 
groups, since the number of times to send a group ID is relatively small compared 
with broadcasting tag IDs and their hash values. On the other hand , the execution 
time of PrivBFG slightly increases as the number of groups increases. This is because 
the retransmissions of group IDs occur due to the false positive filtering of the Bloom 
filter in PrivBFG. 
  Figure 3.8 demonstrates the execution time with respect to the mean of the group 
size [t. In this setting, the number of groups and the standard variance are set to 
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 be a constant, i.e., k = 100 and sigma = 0. Then, the mean of group size  ranges 
from 0 to 100. Note that the number of tags in each groa prup is of the same size, 
as we set u = 0. In addition, the total number of tags N in the system increases 
when p increases. Hence, the execution time increases in proportion to the value 
of p,. PrivBFG and PrivCFG present reduces the execution time by nearly half of 
those of PrivTPG and PrivEPG. Again, PrivEPG yields slightly faster execution than 
PrivTPG. 
  Figure 3.9 illustrates the execution time with respect to the standard variance a, 
where we set m = 10 and p = 1000. The value of a changes from 100 to 800. No 
matter what the value of a is, the total number of tags in the system remains the 
same. Therefore, as the figure indicates, the execution time is independent from the 
value of a. Again, the performance of PrivCFG results in the best.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
 Security/Privacy and scalability issues are concerns when we deploy RFID sys-
tems into realistic systems such as IoT.Therefore, inthis dissertation, we address the 
problem of private tag authentication a d grouping. The summary of this dissertation 
is as follows: 
  First, we seek to preserve higher anonymity of a large-scale RFID system under 
various attacks, including eavesdropping and the compromise attack. To this end, 
we propose Randomized Skip Graph-Based Authentication (RSGA) where one of the 
advanced data structures, called a skip graph, is employed to maintain unique and 
group keys. The key idea of RSGA is the randomization at each level and dependency 
among different levels of the skip graph. In the proposed scheme, the replies from 
two different tags are never distinguishable unless they have exactly the same group 
keys at all the levels, and the analysis shows that the correlation probability of our 
RSGA is much smaller than any of the existing protocols. The proposed RSGA is 
augmented by a key updating algorithm to adopt to a dynamic environment. In 
addition, we propose a path pruning algorithm to further facilitate the singulation 
process by taking a shortcut from an internal node to the corresponding node of a tag 
in a skip graph. By analysis, we derive the correlation probability of RSGA as well as 
that of existing solutions. Furthermore, the key storage cost in terms of the number of 
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 keys stored at the back-end  server as well as at individual tags is analyzed. Moreover, 
the number of gates required by tags are quantified. The performance evaluation by 
computer simulations demonstrates that our RSGA achieves the highest anonymity 
among the existing tree-based, group-based, and skip lists-based protocols in keeping 
with reasonable storage cost. 
  Second, we address the private tag grouping problem. First, we propose an 
indistinguishably-based privacy model. Then, a set of private grouping protocols, 
PrivTPG, PrivEPG, and PrivBFG, based on the existing solutions [28, 19], and 
PrivCFG based on the cuckoo filter. The proposed protocol are proven private by a 
provable security analysis using random oracles. On the performance side, the simu-
lations are conducted to show that our PrivTPG, PrivEPG, PrivBFG, and PrivCFG 
can complete grouping tags within reasonable amount of time. In the future, we will 
further improve private tag grouping protocols as follows. First, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, our privacy model has some limitations. Thus, we will improve the privacy 
model. Second, while adversaries cannot link tags and their groups, the group IDs 
themselves are disclosed in the proposed protocols. Therefore, we will design an effi-
cient grouping protocol that simultaneously labels tags in the same group in keeping 
with the group IDs in secret. 
Our work is important both in theory and practical. Our results can be applied to 
existing RFID applications to increase the degree of security, reliability, and scalability 
without sacrificing system performance. We believe that the proposed protocol and 
architecture will be the foundation of the next generation RFID systems.
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